CHAPTER 9: ILOCANDIA'S HOPE

Chavit Singson, pride of Ilocos Sur

Former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos had 7 as his lucky number. He declared Martial Law on September 21 (divisible by 7) 1972. A quarter of a century later, Ping Lacson (who belonged to PMA Class 71) would be identified with the code name “71.” Another man came around to make a name for himself—Chavit Singson—and likewise staked his claim to the number “71.”

I

n 1971, the time of Chavit—at least in politics—has come. He won as Governor of Ilocos Sur in that year.

“71 seems to be my lucky number,” he said.

Born on June 21, 1941, Luis Crisologo Singson is the second of 8 children by Seling Singson and his wife, Caring Crisologo. Looking back, Luis admits he does not know why he ended up being called “Chavit.”

The Singsons were descendants of Chinese ancestors. In 1764, Joaquin Ayco, a Chinese merchant, married Rosa Songnio, a Chinese mestiza, of Vigan. Six generations later, Chavit was born.

Chavit’s 6 siblings, aside from Titong, included Bernardo, Fernando (Dodoy), Maria Livia (Honeygirl), Jerry, Germilina (Germy), and Bonito.

Like the Crisologos, the Singsons were not new to local officialdom. In 1846, Don Leon Singson, a third-generation member of the clan, served as Gobernadorcillo of Vigan. From then on and at any given period of the area’s political history, a Singson or one of its kind would be at the helm.

Chavit grew up in a family that was free from want. Seling, Chavit’s father, was a civil engineer and a businessman. His construction firm was a leading contractor in the region. Caring, Chavit’s mother, on her own or in partnership with family members, had likewise operated a number of thriving businesses. These included restaurants, movie houses, movie production and, of course, tobacco trading. 

Steeped in the Chinese tradition of social and business networking at the time, Caring liked to gather her friends for parties and mahjong sessions. Sources say Chavit acquired from his mother his flair for winning money games, mahjong among them.

Chavit went through formal education in what might be considered as an erratic school hopping, undoubtedly influenced by an environment that promoted a mix of leisure and vices, and probably driven by the thrill-seeking appetite of his youth. Nevertheless, he did manage to earn a degree in Bachelor of Science in Commerce from the Colegio de San Juan de Letran. He also tried architecture at the University of the East but hardly made a dint in it. He even studied embalming (to help the family’s funeral parlor business, he said).

A man with a myriad of dreams, Chavit was also into tobacco trading business. He needed to develop contacts for this venture, and this was how he developed friendship with Evelyn Verzoza, also of Vigan, and a distant relative of the Crisologos.

Evelyn and Chavit carried on to being more than friends. They tied the matrimonial knot in May 1962. He was 21; she was 19. They begot 7 children before they eventually untied their marital union and went their separate ways.

At 23 Chavit added to his long list of pre-occupations his first job in government—as Chief of Police of Vigan.

At 26, in 1967, he was elected as Councilor of Vigan.

He assumed office as Governor of Ilocos Sur in January 1972. At the Provincial Capitol, his first order of business was to restore the peace. He dangled an amnesty program for the saka-saka, among others, to give up their arms and their nefarious trade. The bandits responded positively, and the result was dramatic for the province. The people of Ilocos Sur, in the main, once more lived in relative peace.

Business confidence returned. Gradually, and in small doses at first, the local economy generated livelihood opportunities for the people.

Chavit’s label as the knight in shining armor for Ilocos had been marked. The son of the Itneg and Tinggian tribes of the Cordilleras, a descendant of Chinese bloodline, and survivor of the Wild, Wild North, had come of age.

Tested by adversity and molded by his past, Chavit was all set to seize his future.

It was a future where the people of Ilocos Sur affirmed and re-affirmed their trust in him. For more than 30 years now (as Governor from 1972 to 1986 [14 years], then as Congressman from 1988 to 1992 [4 years], and back as Governor from 1992 to 2001 [9 years], then from 2004 to 2007 [3 years], and finally from 2010 to the present [2011, 2 years and counting]), Chavit had earned his people’s mandate through the electoral process.

And it was with his being Governor that he got around to realize the magnitude of his task. He saw the need to redeem the majority of his people from the bondage of want. 

The provincial government had little with which to push a truly responsive development agenda. In 1988, he decided to seek a congressional mandate with one objective in mind: collect from the national government a share of excise tax on Virginia tobacco being produced by Ilocos Sur and 3 other provinces.

He succeeded in winning a congressional seat as well as in enacting a law—Republic Act 7171—also known as “An Act to Promote the Development of the Farmers in the Virginia Tobacco-Producing Provinces,” or simply “Tobacco Excise Tax Law.”

“Nobody did it on purpose,” Chavit beamed, “but there it was, my favorite number—71.”

The law required the national government to remit, on pro rata basis, to the four Virginia tobacco-producing provinces—Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Abra and La Union—at least 15 percent of proceeds from excise tax on the Virginia tobacco they produced.

“Ernie Maceda advised me to just let the bill lapse into law,” Chavit remembered.

Ernesto “Ernie” Maceda was member of the Philippine Senate at the time, and he probably felt that Fidel “Eddie” Ramos—earlier endorsed by Cory for President in the upcoming 1992 presidential election—might make it hard for President Corazon “Cory” Aquino to sign RA 7171. Months earlier, master organizer Eddie had been working hard on the skeletal make-up of his political networks at the local level, even as he ostensibly served Cory as Secretary of National Defense.

In Ilocos Sur, Eddie miscalculated. He thought Chavit was not worth the trouble having him as an ally. Eddie and Chavit, therefore, had an awkward time together and Ernie, always keen on political dynamics at the highest level, knew this.

RA 7171, already signed by both chambers of Congress and parked at Cory’s desk, would automatically become a law after 30 days even if she did not touch it. Indeed, it was not necessary to nudge her with her pen if Eddie’s presence loomed somewhere at the back.

“You’ll get your RA 7171, anyway,” was what the diplomatic Ernie could be telling Chavit.

But Chavit ignored Ernie. “Not my style,” he could have told Ernie.

He went to Malacañang and called on Cory. The President signed RA 7171 into law on January 9, 1992, or some six months before her term ended.

Even then, the amount of tobacco excise taxes was already running into billions of pesos. A portion of that would already mean a lot to the four Ilocos Provinces.

For two decades, from the time Chavit became Governor in 1971 to the day he delivered RA 7171 in 1992, the province of Ilocos Sur—compared to many other provinces in the country—has had a bright past. With the law, its future looked brighter.

But not too fast. When Eddie won the 1992 elections and became president of the Philippines, RA 7171 failed on its promise. Or to be more precise, the government did not implement it.

And something worse—as far as Chavit was concerned—was yet to come. Eddie, the cigar-chomping President, wanted the law amended. For Chavit, amending a law that has never been implemented smacked of high-handedness and deceit on the part of the Ramos government. “How can we know something needs to be fixed when it has yet to be tried?” he reasoned, explaining that “the role of the President is to implement the law, whether he likes it or not.”

Eddie wanted all tobacco-producing provinces, and not just the Virginia tobacco-producing provinces, to be beneficiaries of RA 7171.

Although most northern Luzon provinces, including Pangasinan—Eddie’s home province—produce tobacco, not all—except the four mentioned earlier—produce Virginia tobacco. Virginia tobacco is harder to grow and thrives only in areas where climatic conditions are similar to that of Ilocos Sur and nearby provinces. What differentiates Virginia tobacco from other tobacco products is its industrial value. Cigarette and cigar manufacturers exclusively use Virginia tobacco for their production requirements.

By shelving RA 7171 and pushing for its contorted amendment, Eddie and his government had erected a wall so frustrating—where Chavit was concerned—for its immovability. He felt like he was up against a powerful Marcos-Crisologo-type-of-challenge all over again.

Chavit did not run away from Marcos and Crisologo then. He would not shy away from a fight now.

At the House of Representatives, Chavit lobbied with then Speaker Jose de Venecia against the bill amending RA 7171. To be more precise, he actually threatened congressional leaders with belligerence. “I will take up arms and go to the hills if you proceed with this amendment,” he warned.

The law survived the attempted assault on its integrity.

And Chavit kept his peace.

Still, nothing even remotely encouraging for its advocates came out of the law after six years of the Ramos presidency.

When Joseph “Erap” Estrada became president, Chavit knew the wheels of fortune have turned in Ilocandia’s favor. It was time to reap the fruits of RA 7171.

Erap was his friend. “I was the first Provincial Governor in the Philippines who openly supported his candidacy in 1998,” Chavit said.

Just the same, it was not as easy as Chavit imagined it might have been. Insofar as his version of the story went, the release of RA 7171 funds to Ilocos Sur and the rest of the beneficiary provinces would be dependent on what Erap wanted him to do. When Erap asked him to collect his share of the jueteng money, he obliged, all for sake of his pet law. When Erap hinted at his share of the RA 7171 windfall, Chavit also caved in.

Devil’s money

When he was still alive, Jaime Cardinal Sin was once quoted as saying that “I will receive money from the devil so I can give it to the poor.”

Chavit said he never admitted—during the impeachment trial (December 2000) and Erap’s plunder trial (2002-2007)—that he was a jueteng lord. What he said was he agreed to collect jueteng money so the release of funds due his province as mandated by RA 7171 could be facilitated. He thought something good would come out of the devil’s money.

“I was used by jueteng operators,” he claimed. He also called Erap as lord of all jueteng lords.

In August 1998, Erap—barely a month in office—bared his priorities as head of state. He called Chavit and Rodolfo “Bong” Pineda to a meeting at his private residence in San Juan to discuss new directions for the game. More specifically, to set new directions of how Erap could collect his share from jueteng money. Like masiao and other numbers game, jueteng is illegal in the Philippines. But they thrive, because one, people like to gamble and, two, gambling operators bribe law enforcers and other government officials with “protection money” so they could go about their trade unhampered. The meeting ended with Chavit tasked to collect Erap’s share of the protection money.

“I could not afford to be out of his inner circle of friends, lest the release of RA 7171 funds for the beneficiary provinces might be compromised again,” Chavit rationalized.

“But why it had to be you?” I asked him in an interview, in reference to his being the designated chief cabo.[1]

“Erap thought that Bong coming over to deliver jueteng money would be too vulgar,” he said. Chavit related that Erap and Bong had been into jueteng for years. “But if it was me doing the chore, people would think it was all official business because I was Governor. And” Chavit added, “I was not only Governor. I was also his kumpadre.”

Bong Pineda, of course, is to jueteng as Tiger Woods was to golf. Although Bong and Erap had been friends (they are kumpadres—Bong stood as one of Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada’s, Erap’s son by Luisa “Loi” Pimentel Estrada, sponsors in Jinggoy’s wedding), since Erap was Vice President, people would have found it hard not to connect the dots when Bong was seen hobnobbing too often with Erap.

During Erap’s plunder trial at the Sandiganbayan (2002-2007) where he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, both he and son Jinggoy denied Chavit’s allegations, including the one linking the then President to Bong.

Erap charged that Chavit, not him or Jinggoy, was the one involved in jueteng. But he did not explain why he, as President and therefore chief implementor of the law, had not apprehended Chavit despite the many instances that they were together and his knowledge that his erstwhile friend was breaking the law.

In trying to disentangle themselves from jueteng, Erap brought up his professional record on the matter.

To quote the court records: “[Erap] Estrada asserted that his policy against gambling had not changed, even when he was a senator, Vice President and President. However, he realized when he was a mayor that jueteng which was a gambling for the poor was illegal and its collectors were harassed while the casino for the rich was legal. He delivered his first privilege speech at the Senate on November 25, 1987, … where he advocated the legalization of jueteng in order that the government through PAGCOR could earn Twelve Million Pesos every day or Three Hundred Sixty Million Pesos a month which could be used to provide essential services for the poor instead of the enrichment of the police and illegal operators. … As President, he appointed Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma as Chairperson of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and asked her to study how to legalize jueteng. She retired only after less than two (2) months to take care of her sick husband. Later it was assigned to her successor Rosario Lopez, who begged off as she was new on the job. Chairperson Alice Reyes of PAGCOR took over and finished the study.”   

It would seem that depriving the poor of a legal way to gamble when there was one for the rich was an injustice that Erap wanted to correct by legalizing jueteng. He envisioned millions of pesos in revenues that could be used to fund projects for the poor; but he could not seem to see that such a method would first rip the poor off of their hard-earned money.

Some sociologists say that the Filipinos’ idea of tact is to say “yes” when they mean “no,” or “no”when they mean “yes.” But Erap just could not seem to get it when twice his jueteng legalization push was met with a cold reception—courtesy of Justice Palma and Lopez. They probably could not say no to him; unfortunately, their body language was esoteric.

Laquian, whose long stay in another country might have made it easy for him to do away with Filipino ambivalence, would remark: “The Filipino people had not elected a conceptual President.”

Erap further testified that he issued orders to the Philippine National Police (PNP) to stamp out jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling throughout the country.

Aside from the Sandiganbayan, there were others who did not believe him. In a 2009 speech at the Senate, Ping said the directives and the police raids on jueteng operations were all for show.

Chavit said he was concerned during the first few months of being Erap’s collector that General Roberto Lastimoso, then the PNP Director General, did not accept “his share” of the protection money. Chavit delivered 3 million pesos to the PNP chief in November 1998, but the bribe offer was initially refused. Chavit however suggested that a round-about route may have found its way to the addressee.

After having informed Erap of Latimoso’s belligerence, the three met at Malacañang where Erap told Lastimoso to coordinate with Chavit in relation to the latter’s task. Lastimoso reportedly explained that he needed to coordinate with the Regional Commanders so that the anti-illegal gambling operations may proceed, but with the intent of making a fuss about them and nothing else. The jueteng crackdown was all but real.

Ping, again in that 2009 speech, thought aloud that his genuine opposition to jueteng might have kept him from the top PNP post. In public, Erap had been heard as saying Ping could not be appointed PNP chief while his Kuratong Baleleng case was pending with the court.[2] Ping and Lastimoso, throughout Erap’s presidency, had been at odds with each other. Lastimoso resigned in November 1999 over allegations that linked him to the underworld, a demolition assault for which he blamed Ping as the mastermind. Erap picked Ping as Lastimoso’s replacement.          

The desire for jueteng money— “a convenient resource,” Chavit said of Erap’s position, “because he felt he could not be charged for stealing government money”—would prove to be a reckless chase that tripped their friendship. It was, from Erap’s end, probably an unnecessary fumble that led to his fall from power.

Tax take

Chavit saw his friend Erap at Malacañang to request action on the RA 7171 funds for Ilocos Sur that were never released during the six years that Eddie Ramos was president.

Erap had barely settled on his presidential seat when Chavit nudged him.

“It was a promise he made to the people of Ilocos Sur during the election campaign,” Chavit said, in reference to the release of R.A. 7171 funds. He contended that the national government owed the Ilocos provinces billions of pesos.

The request brightened up Erap’s day. The newly elected president confided to Chavit the expenses he incurred during the elections. Chavit instantly got the drift and asked: “How much?”

Chavit testified in the plunder trial that they agreed on a 10 percent cut for the president from RA 7171 releases. On his turn at the witness stand, Erap said he never ran out of campaign money so he couldn’t have asked Chavit about helping him out on that issue. In fact, Erap said, the donors were so many that his political party—the Partido ng Masang Pilipino—were able to fund the expenses of local candidates.

When the DBM did let go of 200 million pesos at Chavit’s behest and as approved by Erap, Chavit—survivor of multiple ambushes—had the shock of his life when informed that he needed to part with 130 million of the total amount.

“I thought we agreed on a 10 percent cut,” Chavit complained to Charlie “Aton” Ang.

As Erap’s high stakes gambling buddy, Atong became a celebrity of sorts when media broadcasted a video showing him and then Vice President Erap playing baccarat at the Silahis Hotel Casino in Manila. It was election time. People had their way of promoting one candidate and denigrating the other.  A few lawyers commented then that it was illegal for a public official to sniff air at any casino.

Edgar Bentain, the hotel employee believed to have gone out of his way (accounts said he decided to take the spy job when he saw Erap’s security escorts napping after a heavy snack) to record the video in January 1998, was abducted by unidentified men in January 1999. He was never seen again, alive or dead, since then.

“There will be more releases,” Atong assured Chavit. Indeed, better to please than displease the one who held the key to realizing one’s ambition and say goodbye to the billions in the dreamer’s mind. Chavit relented and, according to him (Chavit), gave Erap the 130 million pesos he asked from the total RA 7171 release of 200 million pesos.

There had been no releases since then. “Erap did not honor our agreement,” Chavit said. 

In 2001, after an abortive impeachment trial, and with the deaths of Bubby Dacer, Emmanuel Corbito and 22 more deaths from the December 30, 2000 bombings serving as backdrop, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo supplanted Erap from his royal throne in Malacañang. Heavily indebted to Chavit, Gloria made it easy for the government to implement RA 7171this time.

“From an annual income of 2 million pesos in 1972, we now have an annual budget of 800 million pesos,” Chavit said. Almost half of Ilocos Sur’s revenues came from RA 7171.

The provincial government could have appropriated for itself larger amounts of money. Chavit, however, introduced a way by which the component LGUs of the province could have direct access to the fund. Under a sharing scheme adopted through consensus, the entire proceeds for the province would be distributed in accordance with the following formula: 30 percent for the two congressional districts (at 15 per cent each); 40 percent for the 32 towns and 2 cities; and 30 percent for the provincial government.

Much of the progress that happened in Ilocandia could be attributed to the re-flow of funds generated by RA 7171. Continued de la Cruz in his Philippine Star article: “[the law] became the goose that laid golden eggs for the Ilocos region, resulting in more jobs and billions in provincial revenue.”

Chavit went into trouble with both the Eddie and Erap administrations. Looking at how Ilocos Sur—Ilocos Norte, La Union and Abra also have him to thank for—had progressed, one may agree with Chavit that going through those troubles was worth it.

“But the government has a policy against cigarette smoking. Has it not adversely affected the market for Virginia tobacco?”

“On the contrary, sale of Virginia tobacco from Ilocos has been increasing over the last few years,” Chavit replied. “People are hard-headed.”

That there is money in tobacco is true. That Ilocandia is cashing on it is also true. And this, to a large extent, is being made possible by millions of slaves of nicotine who gamely put their own physical health at risk—if we go by what health authorities say.

One finds a wellspring of hope in the incurable habit of the other.

 

 

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[1] In jueteng parlance, a cabo is the one who collects bets, the lowest in the hierarchy of the illegal gambling game’s operations at the community level.

[2] Ira Pedrasa of GMA News reported that “In 1999, 11 members of Kuratong Baleleng were killed by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, led by Panfilo Lacson. In 2003, the High Tribunal ordered the Quezon City Regional Trial Court to try the case against Lacson and 33 other police officials. The trial court however dismissed the criminal case, finding absence of probable cause. The special prosecuting team later moved for new trial before the High Tribunal to remand case to the trial court to present new evidence against Senator Lacson, inter alia. On May 2, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines resolved to take cognizance of the motion of the families of the slain Kuratong Baleleng members for revival of the murder case against police officials and Senator Panfilo Lacson.”

The Kuratong Baleleng group, according to Jose Torres in his 2003 PCIJ report, the group was originally established by the Philippine military in 1986 to guard against the spread of communist guerrillas in Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur provinces. The first leader, chosen directly by the military, was Ongkoy Parojinog, who allegedly used the group both for its expressed purpose as well as to conduct illegal activities. Parojinog was later being killed by Philippine soldiers. When the group was officially disbanded in 1988, they continued to operate as an organized crime syndicate.Over time, the group grew, with other gangs using the name Kuratong Balelang to cover their own activities. Eventually, the group splintered into multiple, smaller groups headquartered in various cities around the region. The groups are involved in a variety of illegal activities, including robberies, smuggling, kidnapping, murders, extortion, the drug trade, and illegal gambling. According to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, that part of the group’s strength is that it is protected by both local and national government officials.^”